Clarification and Enhancement of the CSR Attributes Definition in RFC 7030 Sandelman Software Works
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SEC lamps SubjectAltName SAN Certificate Extensions Certificate Signing Request This document updates RFC 7030, "Enrollment over Secure Transport" (EST), clarifying how the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attributes Response can be used by an EST server to specify both CSR attribute Object Identifiers (OIDs) and CSR attribute values, particularly X.509 extension values, that the server expects the client to include in a subsequent CSR request. RFC 9148 is derived from RFC 7030 and is also updated. RFC 7030 is ambiguous in its specification of the CSR Attributes Response. This has resulted in implementation challenges and implementor confusion because there was no universal understanding of what was specified. This document clarifies the encoding rules. This document also provides a new straightforward approach: using a template for CSR contents that may be partially filled in by the server. This also allows an EST server to specify a subject Distinguished Name (DN).
Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at .
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Table of Contents
  • .  Introduction
  • .  Terminology
  • .  CSR Attributes Handling
    • .  Extensions to RFC 7030, Section 2.6
    • .  Extensions to RFC 7030, Section 4.5.2
    • .  Update to RFC 9148
    • .  Use of CSR Templates
  • .  Coexistence with Existing Implementations
  • .  Examples Using the Original Approach in RFC 7030
    • .  Require an RFC 8994 / ACP subjectAltName with Specific otherName
      • .  Base64-Encoded Example
      • .  ASN.1 DUMP Output
    • .  Original Example in RFC 7030
      • .  Base64-Encoded Example
      • .  ASN.1 DUMP Output
    • .  Require a Specific subjectAltName Extension
      • .  Base64-Encoded Example
      • .  ASN.1 DUMP Output
    • .  Require a Public Key of a Specific Size
      • .  Base64-Encoded Example
      • .  ASN.1 DUMP Output
    • .  Require a Public Key of a Specific Curve
      • .  Base64-Encoded Example
      • .  ASN.1 DUMP Output
    • .  Require Specific Extensions and Attributes
      • .  Base64-Encoded Example
      • .  ASN.1 DUMP Output
  • .  Security Considerations
    • .  Identity and Privacy Considerations
  • .  IANA Considerations
  • .  References
    • .  Normative References
    • .  Informative References
  • .  ASN.1 Module
  • Acknowledgments
  • Authors' Addresses
Introduction This document updates RFC 7030 and clarifies how the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) Attributes Response can be used by an EST server to specify both CSR attribute OIDs and CSR attribute values. In particular, the server needs to be able to specify X.509 extension values that it expects the client to include in the subsequent CSR. "Enrollment over Secure Transport" has been used in a wide variety of applications. In particular, and describe a way to use it in order to build out an Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) . When bootstrapping the ACP, there is a requirement that each node be given a very specific subjectAltName. In , the ACP specification, the EST server is specified to make use of the CSR Attributes ("/csrattrs") Request (specified in ) to convey the actual subjectAltName to the EST client that needs to go into its CSR and thus ultimately into its End Entity (EE) certificate. As a result of some implementation challenges, it came to light that this particular way of using the CSR Attributes was not universally agreed upon, and it was suggested that it went contrary to . says that the CSR Attributes "can provide additional descriptive information that the EST server cannot access itself". This is extended to describe how the EST server can provide values that it demands be used. After significant discussion, it has been determined that is sufficiently difficult to read and ambiguous to interpret, so clarification is needed. Also, is extended to clarify the use of the existing ASN.1 syntax . This covers all uses and is fully backward compatible with existing use, including addressing the needs of and .
Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
CSR Attributes Handling
Extensions to RFC 7030, Section 2.6 This document replaces the second paragraph in with the following text:
These attributes can provide additional information that the EST server cannot access itself, such as the Media Access Control (MAC) address of an interface of the EST client. The EST server can also provide concrete values that it tells the client to include in the CSR, such as a specific X.509 Subject Alternative Name extension. Moreover, these attributes can indicate the type of the included public key or which crypto algorithms to use for the self-signature, such as a specific elliptic curve or a specific hash function that the client is expected to use when generating the CSR.
Extensions to RFC 7030, Section 4.5.2 The ASN.1 syntax for CSR Attributes as defined in EST () is as follows: CsrAttrs ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (0..MAX) OF AttrOrOID AttrOrOID ::= CHOICE (oid OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attribute Attribute } Attribute { ATTRIBUTE:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id({IOSet}), values SET SIZE(1..MAX) OF ATTRIBUTE.&Type({IOSet}{@type}) } This remains unchanged, such that bits-on-the-wire compatibility is maintained. Key parts that were unclear were which OID to use in the 'type' field and that the 'values' field can contain an entire sequence of X.509 extensions. The OID to use for such attributes in the 'type' field MUST be id-ExtensionReq, which has the value 1.2.840.113549.1.9.14. Note that this is the same as pkcs-9-at-extensionRequest defined in PKCS#9 . There MUST be only one such attribute. The 'values' field of this attribute MUST contain a set with exactly one element, and this element MUST be of type Extensions, as per : Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension Extension ::= SEQUENCE { extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING -- contains the DER encoding of an ASN.1 value -- corresponding to the extension type identified -- by extnID } An Extension comprises the OID of the specific X.509 extension (extnID), optionally the 'critical' bit, and the extension value (extnValue). An Extensions structure, which is a sequence of elements of type Extension, MUST NOT include more than one element with a particular extnID. When not using the template-based approach of , specifying the requirement for a public key of a specific type and optionally its size and other parameters MUST be done as follows: Include exactly one Attribute with the type field being the OID specifying the type of the key, such as ecPublicKey or rsaEncryption. The 'values' field MAY be empty to indicate no further requirements on the key. Otherwise, it MUST contain suitable parameters for the given key type, such as a singleton set containing the OID of an elliptic curve (EC) (e.g., secp384r1) or containing an integer value for the RSA key size (e.g., 4096). Many examples for this are given in .
Update to RFC 9148 The updates to EST in this document equally apply when using the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) as a transport mechanism as described in . This document therefore adds the following paragraph after the second paragraph of :
EST over CoAP as specified in applies unchanged to , which is updated by RFC 9908. Hence, all references to in are assumed to indicate that is updated by RFC 9908.
Use of CSR Templates As an alternative to the unstructured inclusion of CSR Attributes specified in with its limitations and ambiguities, describes an approach using a CSR template. An entire CSR object is returned with various fields filled out and other fields waiting to be filled in. In that approach, a pKCS7PDU attribute includes a PKIData content type and that, in turn, includes a CSR or a Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) formatted request (for details, see or of , respectively). One drawback to that approach, particularly for the CSR, is that some unused fields have to be included; specifically, the 'signature' field on the CSR is faked with an empty bit string. A similar method has been defined in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)" and "Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile" () using a CSR template as defined for CRMF . Like the approach mentioned before, this method does not properly deal with absent Relative Distinguished Name (RDN) values, as it would encode them as invalid empty strings. Also, encoding an absent 'subjectPublicKey' value as an empty BIT STRING and an absent X.509 extension value as an empty OCTET STRING can cause issues with strict ASN.1 parsing and decoding. These drawbacks are avoided as follows: This specification defines a new Certificate Request Information Template attribute for CsrAttrs (as given in ) that is essentially a partially filled-in PKCS#10 CSR minus the signature wrapper: CertificationRequestInfoTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1, ... ), subject NameTemplate OPTIONAL, subjectPKInfo [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate {{ PKInfoAlgorithms }} OPTIONAL, attributes [1] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }} } contains all details. The CertificationRequestInfoTemplate closely resembles the CertificationRequestInfo from : CertificationRequestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1,...), subject Name, subjectPKInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo{{ PKInfoAlgorithms }}, attributes [0] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }} } with the following differences:
  • The 'subject' field has been made OPTIONAL. It MUST be present if the server places any requirements on the RDNs of the subject name; otherwise, it MUST be absent.
  • RDNs in the 'subject' fields are allowed to have no value, which has been achieved by adding OPTIONAL to the 'value' field of SingleAttributeTemplate. If the client is expected to provide an RDN of a certain type such as commonName, the respective RDN MUST be present in the 'subject' field; otherwise, it MUST be absent. In addition, if the server gives an RDN value, this means that the client is expected to use this value for the RDN; otherwise, the client is expected to fill in a suitable value. The example at the end of this section has a 'subject' field that contains both forms of RDN specifications.
SingleAttributeTemplate {ATTRIBUTE:AttrSet} ::= SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id({AttrSet}), value ATTRIBUTE.&Type({AttrSet}{@type}) OPTIONAL }
  • The 'subjectPKInfo' field has been made OPTIONAL. The field MUST be absent if the server places no requirements on the key; otherwise, it MUST be present, and the 'algorithm' field specifies the type of key pair the client is expected to use.
  • The 'subjectPublicKey' field contained in SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate has been made OPTIONAL because it is usually not needed. In case the server requires use of an RSA key and needs to specify its size, the field MUST be present and contain a placeholder public key value of the desired RSA modulus length; otherwise, the subjectPublicKey MUST be absent.
SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate{PUBLIC-KEY:IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {IOSet}}, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING OPTIONAL }
  • A new OID id-aa-extensionReqTemplate and the related ExtensionTemplate structure is defined where the 'extnValue' field has been made OPTIONAL. This is only needed to enable specifying partial extensions with values to be filled in by the client; otherwise, the id-ExtensionReq OID and the respective value of type ExtensionReq MUST be used for specifying requirements on X.509 extensions.
For each extension of type Extension or ExtensionTemplate provided by the server, the client is expected to include an extension of the type given by the extnID. If the 'critical' field is present, the client SHOULD use it in the extension as well. If the 'extnValue' is present (which is always the case when type Extension is used), the client SHOULD use the given extension value in its CSR. When the type ExtensionTemplate is used, the 'extnValue' can be absent, and then the client SHOULD provide an extension value in an Extension with the given extnID. For instance, if the server includes an ExtensionTemplate with the extnID 'subjectAltName' but without an extnValue, the client SHOULD include a SAN extension with a suitable value. In case the server includes an ExtensionTemplate with the extnID 'subjectAltName' and a partially filled-in extnValue, such as a 'directoryName' choice containing the NULL-DN (i.e., an empty sequence of RDNs) or the 'iPAddress' choice with an empty OCTET STRING, it means that the client SHOULD fill in the respective GeneralName value. ExtensionTemplate {EXTENSION:ExtensionSet} ::= SEQUENCE { extnID EXTENSION.&id({ExtensionSet}), critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING (CONTAINING EXTENSION.&ExtnType({ExtensionSet}{@extnID}) OPTIONAL -- contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 value -- corresponding to the extension type identified -- by extnID when present } The 'version' field of the CertificationRequestInfoTemplate MUST contain v1 (0). The 'attributes' field MUST NOT contain multiple id-aa-extensionReqTemplate attributes and MUST NOT contain both id-ExtensionReq and id-aa-extensionReqTemplate attributes. The 'values' field of an id-aa-extensionReqTemplate attribute MUST contain a set with exactly one element, and this element MUST be of type ExtensionTemplate. Suppose the server requires that the CSR will contain:
  • the 'subject' field with a common name to be filled in by the EE and two organizational unit names with given values "myDept" and "myGroup",
  • the 'publicKey' field with an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) public key on curve secp256r1,
  • the 'subjectAltName' extension with two entries; one DNS entry with name "www.myServer.com" and IP entry that is empty for the IP address to be filled in,
  • the 'keyUsage' extension marked critical with the values digitalSignature and keyAgreement, and
  • the 'extKeyUsage' extension with the value to be filled in by the EE.
Then, the CertificationRequestInfo structure constructed by the server will be as follows: SEQUENCE { INTEGER 0 SEQUENCE { SET { SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) } } SET { SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) UTF8String "myDept" } } SET { SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationalUnitName (2 5 4 11) UTF8String "myGroup" } } } [0] { SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1) OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp256r1 (1 2 840 10045 3 1 7) } } [1] { SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-aa-extensionReqTemplate (1 2 840 113549 1 9 62) SET { SEQUENCE { SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectAltName (2 5 29 17) OCTET STRING, encapsulates { SEQUENCE { [2] "www.myServer.com" [7] "" } } } SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) BOOLEAN TRUE OCTET STRING, encapsulates { BIT STRING 3 unused bits "10001"B } } SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER extKeyUsage (2 5 29 37) } } } } } }
Coexistence with Existing Implementations EST servers with legacy clients MAY continue to use the unstructured list of attribute/value pairs as described in and MAY also include the template style described in for newer clients. Clients that understand both MUST use the template only, and ignore all other CsrAttrs elements. Older clients will ignore the new CertificationRequestInfoTemplate element.
Examples Using the Original Approach in RFC 7030 Each example has a high-level (English) explanation of what is expected. Some mapping back to the Attribute and Extension definitions above are included. The base64 DER encoding is then shown. The output of "dumpasn1" is then provided to detail what the contents are.
Require an RFC 8994 / ACP subjectAltName with Specific otherName A single subjectAltName extension is specified in a single CsrAttrs attribute with an OID 'id-ExtensionReq' indicating type Extensions. This is what might be created by a Registrar that is asking for AcpNodeName with format 'otherNames'.
Base64-Encoded Example The Base64: MGgwZgYJKoZIhvcNAQkOMVkwVzBVBgNVHREBAf8ESzBJoEcG CCsGAQUFBwgKoDsWOXJmYzg5OTQrZmQ3MzlmYzIzYzM0NDAx MTIyMzM0NDU1MDAwMDAwMDArQGFjcC5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQ==
ASN.1 DUMP Output There is a single subjectAltName Extension with an Attribute with Extension type. <30 68> 0 104: SEQUENCE { <30 66> 2 102: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 4 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : extensionRequest (1 2 840 113549 1 9 14) : (PKCS #9 via CRMF) <31 59> 15 89: SET { <30 57> 17 87: SEQUENCE { <30 55> 19 85: SEQUENCE { <06 03> 21 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER : subjectAltName (2 5 29 17) : (X.509 extension) <01 01> 26 1: BOOLEAN TRUE <04 4B> 29 75: OCTET STRING, encapsulates { <30 49> 31 73: SEQUENCE { <A0 47> 33 71: [0] { <06 08> 35 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 10' <A0 3B> 45 59: [0] { <16 39> 47 57: IA5String : 'rfc8994+fd739fc23c34401122334455' : '00000000+@acp.example.com' : } : } : } : } : } : } : } : } : }
Original Example in RFC 7030 In this example, taken from , a few different attributes are included. The original encoding of the 'macAddress' part in the example is NOT CORRECT. It was not aligned with the definition of the Extension Request attribute as specified in . The revised encoding given here does not use an 'id-ExtensionReq' attribute because the MAC Address is not an X.509 certificate extension by itself and because the server provides its OID without a value, which is not allowed syntactically within a structure of type 'Extension'.
Base64-Encoded Example The Base64: MDIGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiBgcr BgEBAQEWBggqhkjOPQQDAw==
ASN.1 DUMP Output The CsrAttrs structure contains:
  1. The challengePassword attribute to indicate that the CSR should include this value.
  2. An ecPublicKey OID with the value secp384r1 to indicate what kind of public key should be submitted.
  3. The macAddress OID 1.3.6.1.1.1.1.22 to indicate that the CSR is expected to include (in a subjectDirectoryAttributes extension) a MAC address value.
  4. The ecdsaWithSHA384 OID to indicate what kind of hash is expected to be used for the self-signature in the PKCS#10 CSR.
<30 32> 0 50: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7) : (PKCS #9) <30 12> 13 18: SEQUENCE { <06 07> 15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1) : (ANSI X9.62 public key type) <31 07> 24 7: SET { <06 05> 26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34) : (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve) : } : } <06 07> 33 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 3 6 1 1 1 1 22' <06 08> 42 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3) : (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA384) : }
Require a Specific subjectAltName Extension This example is the same as the previous one except that instead of the OID for a macAddress, a subjectAltName is specified as the only Extension element.
Base64-Encoded Example The Base64: MEUGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAjBgkq hkiG9w0BCRQGCgmSJomT8ixkAQUGA1UEBQYIKoZIzj0EAwQ=
ASN.1 DUMP Output The CsrAttrs structure contains:
  1. The challengePassword attribute to indicate that the CSR should include this value.
  2. An ecPublicKey OID with the value secp521r1 to indicate what kind of public key should be submitted.
  3. An extensionRequest container with a subjectAltName value containing the name potato@example.com.
  4. The ecdsaWithSHA512 OID to indicate the SHA-512 hash is expected to be used for the self-signature in the PKCS#10 CSR.
<30 45> 0 69: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7) : (PKCS #9) <30 12> 13 18: SEQUENCE { <06 07> 15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1) : (ANSI X9.62 public key type) <31 07> 24 7: SET { <06 05> 26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp521r1 (1 3 132 0 35) : (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve) : } : } <06 09> 33 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER friendlyName (for PKCS #12) (1 2 840 113549 1 9 20) : (PKCS #9 via PKCS #12) <06 0A> 44 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 5' <06 03> 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5) : (X.520 DN component) <06 08> 61 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4) : (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA512) : }
Require a Public Key of a Specific Size The CSR requires an RSA public key of a specific size.
Base64-Encoded Example The Base64: MCkGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzARBgkqhkiG9w0BAQExBAICEAAGCSqG SIb3DQEBCw==
ASN.1 DUMP Output Provide a CSR with an RSA key that's 4096 bits and use SHA256 as the hash algorithm within the signature. <30 29> 0 41: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7) : (PKCS #9) <30 11> 13 17: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 15 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) : (PKCS #1) <31 04> 26 4: SET { <02 02> 28 2: INTEGER 4096 : } : } <06 09> 32 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11) : (PKCS #1) : }
Require a Public Key of a Specific Curve The CSR requires an ECC public key with a specific curve.
Base64-Encoded Example The Base64: MC4GCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAiBgNV BAUGCCqGSM49BAMD
ASN.1 DUMP Output Provide a CSR with an ECC public key from p384, include your serial number, and use SHA384 as the hash algorithm within the signature. <30 2E> 0 46: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7) : (PKCS #9) <30 12> 13 18: SEQUENCE { <06 07> 15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1) : (ANSI X9.62 public key type) <31 07> 24 7: SET { <06 05> 26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp384r1 (1 3 132 0 34) : (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve) : } : } <06 03> 33 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5) : (X.520 DN component) <06 08> 38 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA384 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 3) : (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA384) : }
Require Specific Extensions and Attributes The CSR is required to have an ECC public key, include a serial number, include a friendly name, include a favorite drink [OID 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.5], and use SHA512 as the hash algorithm within the signature.
Base64-Encoded Example The Base64: MEUGCSqGSIb3DQEJBzASBgcqhkjOPQIBMQcGBSuBBAAjBgkq hkiG9w0BCRQGCgmSJomT8ixkAQUGA1UEBQYIKoZIzj0EAwQ=
ASN.1 DUMP Output Provide a CSR with an ECC public key from sha521 and include your serial number, friendly name, and favorite drink, and hash it with SHA512. <30 45> 0 69: SEQUENCE { <06 09> 2 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER challengePassword (1 2 840 113549 1 9 7) : (PKCS #9) <30 12> 13 18: SEQUENCE { <06 07> 15 7: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecPublicKey (1 2 840 10045 2 1) : (ANSI X9.62 public key type) <31 07> 24 7: SET { <06 05> 26 5: OBJECT IDENTIFIER secp521r1 (1 3 132 0 35) : (SECG (Certicom) named elliptic curve) : } : } <06 09> 33 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER friendlyName (for PKCS #12) (1 2 840 113549 1 9 20) : (PKCS #9 via PKCS #12) <06 0A> 44 10: OBJECT IDENTIFIER '0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 5' <06 03> 56 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER serialNumber (2 5 4 5) : (X.520 DN component) <06 08> 61 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER ecdsaWithSHA512 (1 2 840 10045 4 3 4) : (ANSI X9.62 ECDSA algorithm with SHA512) : }
Security Considerations The security considerations from are unchanged.
Identity and Privacy Considerations An EST server may use this mechanism to instruct the EST client about the identities it should include in the CSR it sends as part of enrollment. The client may only be aware of its Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) Subject, which includes a manufacturer serial number. The EST server can use this mechanism to tell the client to include a specific fully qualified domain name in the CSR in order to complete domain ownership proofs required by the CA. Additionally, the EST server may deem the manufacturer serial number in an IDevID as personally identifiable information and may want to specify a new random opaque identifier that the pledge should use in its CSR. This may be desirable if the CA and EST server have different operators.
IANA Considerations For the ASN.1 module in , IANA has assigned the following OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry:
Decimal Description Reference
82 id-mod-critemplate RFC 9908
For the Certification Request Information Template and Extension Request Template attributes in , IANA has assigned the following OIDs in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Attributes (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2)" registry:
Decimal Description Reference
61 id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate RFC 9908
62 id-aa-extensionReqTemplate RFC 9908
References Normative References Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. PKCS #10: Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7 This memo represents a republication of PKCS #10 v1.7 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the security considerations section, is taken directly from the PKCS #9 v2.0 or the PKCS #10 v1.7 document. This memo provides information for the Internet community. New ASN.1 Modules for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. Additional New ASN.1 Modules for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates some auxiliary ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2008 version of ASN.1; the 1988 ASN.1 modules remain the normative version. There are no bits- on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. Enrollment over Secure Transport This document profiles certificate enrollment for clients using Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) messages over a secure transport. This profile, called Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST), describes a simple, yet functional, certificate management protocol targeting Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) clients that need to acquire client certificates and associated Certification Authority (CA) certificates. It also supports client-generated public/private key pairs as well as key pairs generated by the CA. Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with the Secure Constrained Application Protocol Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) is used as a certificate provisioning protocol over HTTPS. Low-resource devices often use the lightweight Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for message exchanges. This document defines how to transport EST payloads over secure CoAP (EST-coaps), which allows constrained devices to use existing EST functionality for provisioning certificates. Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation ITU-T Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) ITU-T Informative References Dump ASN drink(5) [other identifier: favouriteDrink] OID Repository OID 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.5 PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0 This memo represents a republication of PKCS #9 v2.0 from RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series, and change control is retained within the PKCS process. The body of this document, except for the security considerations section, is taken directly from that specification. This memo provides information for the Internet community. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) This document describes the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) syntax and semantics. This syntax is used to convey a request for a certificate to a Certification Authority (CA), possibly via a Registration Authority (RA), for the purposes of X.509 certificate production. The request will typically include a public key and the associated registration information. This document does not define a certificate request protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) This document defines the base syntax for CMC, a Certificate Management protocol using the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This protocol addresses two immediate needs within the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) community: 1. The need for an interface to public key certification products and services based on CMS and PKCS #10 (Public Key Cryptography Standard), and 2. The need for a PKI enrollment protocol for encryption only keys due to algorithm or hardware design. CMC also requires the use of the transport document and the requirements usage document along with this document for a full definition. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK] EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) Extensions The EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) protocol defines the Well-Known URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) -- /.well-known/est -- along with a number of other path components that clients use for PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) services, namely certificate enrollment (e.g., /simpleenroll). This document defines a number of other PKI services as additional path components -- specifically, firmware and trust anchors as well as symmetric, asymmetric, and encrypted keys. This document also specifies the PAL (Package Availability List), which is an XML (Extensible Markup Language) file or JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) object that clients use to retrieve packages available and authorized for them. This document extends the EST server path components to provide these additional services. Using an Autonomic Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM), as per BCP 161, for data networks is often subject to the problem of circular dependencies when relying on connectivity provided by the network to be managed for the OAM purposes. Provisioning while bringing up devices and networks tends to be more difficult to automate than service provisioning later on. Changes in core network functions impacting reachability cannot be automated because of ongoing connectivity requirements for the OAM equipment itself, and widely used OAM protocols are not secure enough to be carried across the network without security concerns. This document describes how to integrate OAM processes with an autonomic control plane in order to provide stable and secure connectivity for those OAM processes. This connectivity is not subject to the aforementioned circular dependencies. An Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) Autonomic functions need a control plane to communicate, which depends on some addressing and routing. This Autonomic Control Plane should ideally be self-managing and be as independent as possible of configuration. This document defines such a plane and calls it the "Autonomic Control Plane", with the primary use as a control plane for autonomic functions. It also serves as a "virtual out-of-band channel" for Operations, Administration, and Management (OAM) communications over a network that provides automatically configured, hop-by-hop authenticated and encrypted communications via automatically configured IPv6 even when the network is not configured or is misconfigured. Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) This document specifies automated bootstrapping of an Autonomic Control Plane. To do this, a Secure Key Infrastructure is bootstrapped. This is done using manufacturer-installed X.509 certificates, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online and offline. We call this process the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol. Bootstrapping a new device can occur when using a routable address and a cloud service, only link-local connectivity, or limited/disconnected networks. Support for deployment models with less stringent security requirements is included. Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device. The established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the device as well. Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile This document aims at simple, interoperable, and automated PKI management operations covering typical use cases of industrial and Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. This is achieved by profiling the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP), the related Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF), and transfer based on HTTP or Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) in a succinct but sufficiently detailed and self-contained way. To make secure certificate management for simple scenarios and constrained devices as lightweight as possible, only the most crucial types of operations and options are specified as mandatory. More specialized or complex use cases are supported with optional features. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) This document describes the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Certificate Management Protocol (CMP). Protocol messages are defined for X.509v3 certificate creation and management. CMP provides interactions between client systems and PKI components such as a Registration Authority (RA) and a Certification Authority (CA). This document adds support for management of certificates containing a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) public key and uses EnvelopedData instead of EncryptedValue. This document also includes the updates specified in Section 2 and Appendix A.2 of RFC 9480. This document obsoletes RFC 4210, and together with RFC 9811, it also obsoletes RFC 9480. Appendix F of this document updates Section 9 of RFC 5912.
ASN.1 Module This appendix provides an ASN.1 module for the Certification Request Information Template attribute and its sub-template structures. It follows the conventions established in , , and . CRITemplateModule { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-critemplate(82) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS -- from [RFC5912] SupportedAttributes FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)} ATTRIBUTE, EXTENSION FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } PUBLIC-KEY, AlgorithmIdentifier{} FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)} CertExtensions FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)} Attributes{}, CRIAttributes, PKInfoAlgorithms FROM PKCS-10 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkcs10-2009(69) } ; aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE CertificationRequestInfoTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate } id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) id-aa-certificationRequestInfoTemplate(61) } -- like CertificationRequestInfo but OPTIONAL subject, subjectPKInfo CertificationRequestInfoTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER { v1(0) } (v1, ... ), subject NameTemplate OPTIONAL, subjectPKInfo [0] SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate {{ PKInfoAlgorithms }} OPTIONAL, attributes [1] Attributes{{ CRIAttributes }} } -- like Name, but with OPTIONAL RDN values NameTemplate ::= CHOICE { -- only one possibility for now -- rdnSequence RDNSequenceTemplate } RDNSequenceTemplate ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedNameTemplate RelativeDistinguishedNameTemplate ::= SET SIZE (1 .. MAX) OF SingleAttributeTemplate { {SupportedAttributes} } -- like Attributes, but with OPTIONAL value SingleAttributeTemplates{ATTRIBUTE:AttrSet} ::= SEQUENCE OF SingleAttributeTemplates{ {AttrSet} } -- like SingleAttribute, but with OPTIONAL value SingleAttributeTemplate{ATTRIBUTE:AttrSet} ::= SEQUENCE { type ATTRIBUTE.&id({AttrSet}), value ATTRIBUTE.&Type({AttrSet}{@type}) OPTIONAL } -- like SubjectPublicKeyInfo, but with OPTIONAL subjectPublicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfoTemplate{PUBLIC-KEY:IOSet} ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {IOSet}}, subjectPublicKey BIT STRING OPTIONAL } id-aa-extensionReqTemplate OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) id-aa-extensionReqTemplate(62) } -- like extensionRequest, but with OPTIONAL Extension extnValues -- original definition was in PKCS#9 RFC 2985, Section 5.4.2 at-extensionReqTemplate ATTRIBUTE ::= { TYPE ExtensionReqTemplate IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-extensionReqTemplate } ExtensionReqTemplate ::= ExtensionTemplates{{CertExtensions}} -- like Extensions, but with OPTIONAL extnValue ExtensionTemplates{EXTENSION:ExtensionSet} ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF ExtensionTemplate{{ExtensionSet}} -- like Extension, but with OPTIONAL extnValue ExtensionTemplate{EXTENSION:ExtensionSet} ::= SEQUENCE { extnID EXTENSION.&id({ExtensionSet}), critical BOOLEAN -- (EXTENSION.&Critical({ExtensionSet}{@extnID})) DEFAULT FALSE, extnValue OCTET STRING (CONTAINING EXTENSION.&ExtnType({ExtensionSet}{@extnID})) OPTIONAL -- contains the DER encoding of the ASN.1 value -- corresponding to the extension type identified -- by extnID when present } END
Acknowledgments crafted Example 2 using a different tool, and this helped debug other running code. provided major parts of the CertificationRequestInfoTemplate syntax declaration. conducted many reviews of the ASN.1 module and suggested many fixes. conducted the usual Area Director Review.
Authors' Addresses Sandelman Software Works
mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Cisco
ofriel@cisco.com
Siemens
dev@ddvo.net
The Industrial Lounge
dharkins@lounge.org